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Stanford, CA 943051 Introduction
An expanding literature on monetary policy analysis uses optimizing dynamic general
equilibrium models in which forward-looking agents face nominal rigidities. This literature builds
on the original time-dependent price adjustment formulations of Taylor (1980), Rotemberg (1982)
and Calvo (1983).
1 The renewed interest in this line of research was motivated by empirical
evidence showing that monetary policy has signiﬁcant short-run real effects.
2 But whether the
inﬂation speciﬁcations derived from such models can fully account for all short-run empirical
properties of inﬂation and output has recently been much debated.
3 In particular, starting with
Fuhrer and Moore (1995), existing rational expectations staggered pricing models in which agents
have perfect information have been sho w nt od i s p l a yam u c hl o w e rd e g r e eo fi n ﬂation inertia than
what is found in the data. This in turn implies that disinﬂation policies have minimal real costs,
or even that anticipated disinﬂations cause booms (Ball, 1994a), which is also inconsistent with a
large body of empirical evidence (see e.g. Gordon 1982, 1997). This paper proposes a tractable
generalization of the Calvo (1983) staggered pricing model that generates both inﬂation inertia and
recessionary disinﬂations in a fully speciﬁed dynamic general equilibrium model.
1 Comprehensive surveys can be found in Gali (2001) and Lane (2001).
2 See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1996, 1998) and Leeper, Sims and Zha (1996).
3 See Taylor (1998) and Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) for a review of the empirical successes of this model
class.
2Our model retains the commonly used Calvo (1983) assumption of exogenous and stochastic
timing of price changing opportunities. Where we depart from the existing literature is in the
speciﬁcation of price setting behavior. In the realistic case of a positive steady state inﬂation rate,
we suggest that it is plausible to assume that ﬁrms employ pricing rules which keep them as close
as possible to their ﬂexible price optimum without incurring reoptimization costs. To keep the
model tractable, we speciﬁcally assume that once a ﬁrm gets the chance to change its pricing plan,
it jointly and optimally chooses an initial price level and a rate at which it will update its price in
the future, a ‘ﬁrm-speciﬁci n ﬂation rate’.
4 This approach differs from the two dominant approaches
in the literature. In one (e.g. Woodford , 2001) ﬁrms choose only a price level without updating. At
positivesteadystateinﬂationthishasbeenshowntogenerateamonetarynonneutrality(Rotemberg
and Woodford,1998) where higher steady state inﬂation implies lower steady state output through
increased price dispersion. This nonneutrality is removed in the second approach, starting with
Yun (1996), where ﬁrms still choose only a price level but update their prices at the steady state
inﬂation rate at all times.
5 But under both of these approaches only the aggregate price level is
sticky while inﬂation is ﬂexible. Credible disinﬂations therefore do not cause recessions.
By contrast, when ﬁrms employ pricing rules of the kind we propose, an unexpected and
permanent decline in the steady state inﬂa t i o nr a t et a r g e t e db ym o n e t a r yp o l i c ye n t a i l sas l o w
4 As our pricing rule does not take the simple form of setting new price levels, it is important to stress that our
motivationfor timedependent nominalrigidities is notbasedonmenucosts (Akerlof andYellen(1985))but instead
on reoptimization costs, such as costs of information gathering, decision making, negotiation and communication.
The empirical evidence presented by Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta and Bergen (2000) emphasizes the importance
of such reoptimization costs relative to menu costs. Christiano et al. (2001) also stress the reoptimization cost
motivation.
5 As we allow for updating, our model also removes the nonneutrality.
3inﬂation response and output losses, even if the change in policy is perfectly credible. There
are two main reasons for this. The ﬁrst is the lingering effect of historic pricing decisions. The
economy initially contains a large number of ﬁrms thathave chosen theirprice updating rates under
the previous policy, and the weighted average of such updating rates is an important component of
aggregate inﬂation. The second reason is the behavior of new price setters. The spread between
ﬁrms’ initially chosen price and thea g g r e g a t ep r i c el e v e l — t e r m e df r o n tl o a d i n gb yC h r i s t i a n oe t
al. (2001) —is the second component of aggregate inﬂation. Because ﬁrms have the option of
updating their prices, front loading will initially respond little to the policy change, contributing to
the sluggishness of the inﬂation response. Finally, the real interest rate change induced by the slow
inﬂation response gives rise to a recession.
6
The motivation for our work was ﬁrst developed in Calvo, Celasun and Kumhof (2001), and
is similar to that of Mankiw and Reis (2002). The latter present a model where price setters
are assumed to be able to reset their price every period, but receive information only at random
intervals. This isequivalenttoassuming that ﬁrms chooseapricepath, and itimplies thataggregate
inﬂation responds to monetary policy changes with a lag and that disinﬂations are recessionary.
The Mankiw and Reis (2002) model is capable of generating predictions that qualitatively match
the inﬂation inertia and recessionary disinﬂations features of the data. Its drawback, however, is
that the model’s microeconomic foundations arenotfullyl ai dou t,w hi chm a k e si tha rd ertoe xp lo re
6 EmpiricaltestsofthepricingmodelbasedonMexicandata, andreportedinCalvo, CelasunandKumhof(2001),
are supportive of our inﬂation speciﬁcation, suggesting that our formulation is a sensible way of capturing inﬂation
inertia in similar countries.
4its quantitative predictions and their sensitivity to the values of structural parameters. It is therefore
also not possible to conduct welfare analysis. The general equilibrium model of Burstein (2002)
can be seen as a way of providing microeconomic foundations for the Mankiw and Reis (2002)
formulation.
7 However it is a nonlinear model and therefore complex to solve. We argue that it
is reasonable to focus on equilibria characterized by a constant steady state growth path for the
n o m i n a la n c h o r .T h em o d e lc a nt h e nb es o l v e db yl i n e a r i z i n ga r o u n dt h a ts t e a d ys t a t e .I nt h a tc a s e
it is sufﬁcient to allow ﬁrms to specify their pricing policies up to the growth rate of their price
path. A considerable advantage of this approach is that our model can be solved with conventional
solution methods, which makes it straightforward to conduct quantitative work including welfare
analysis, as will be shown in Section 4.
The literature related to inﬂation inertia also encompasses models of backward-looking
behavior, imperfectcredibility, learningandsupplysiderigidities. Untilquiterecentlytheliterature
mostly relied on speciﬁcations that were not explicitly built on forward-looking optimizing
behavior. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) present a relative real wage model, while Ghezzi (2001) and
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) modify the Calvo (1983) model to allow for a share of price setters
to be backward looking, in the sense of using a rule of thumb that depends on lagged inﬂation. A
well-known explanation for inﬂation inertia during disinﬂations is lack of credibility, e.g. the
papers by Ball (1995) and Calvo and Vegh (1993). However, in many countries where disinﬂations
were costly the monetary authority enjoyed a high degree of credibility, as argued e.g. by Ball
7 In Burstein’s (2002) model pricing decisions are state- as well as time-dependent, but a pure time dependent
model is shown to be sufﬁcient to characterize disinﬂationary dynamics when the disinﬂation is not too large.
5(1994b). This is therefore only a suitable explanation for a limited number of cases. Models of
learning about monetary policy have recently become popular, and clearly such models do give rise
to inﬂation inertia. Two examples are Woodford (2001) and Erceg and Levin (2002). Christiano,
EichenbaumandEvans(2001)generateinﬂationandoutputinertiainarationalexpectationsmodel
by introducing a number of nominal and real supply side rigidities. Their most successful model
variant does however still rely on a backward-looking price and wage updating scheme.
The pricing mechanism we propose is very general and can be embedded in a variety of
macroeconomic models. The key features of inﬂation inertia and recessionary disinﬂations are
robust across such environments.
8 For this paper we choose an open economy setting, and for
our speciﬁcation of disinﬂationary monetary policy we choose exchange rate targeting.
9 The
disinﬂations we have in mind are the moderate disinﬂations experienced by several industrialized
countries in the 1970s and 1980s, and by a number of countries in Latin America in more recent
years.
10
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3
discusses model calibration and computation of solution paths for a permanent and credible
disinﬂation. Section 4 evaluates the welfare trade-off between the output losses and efﬁciency
8 For example, Kumhof, Cespedes and Parrado (2002) analyze the closed economy case in a discrete time sto-
chastic setting.
9 A model of inﬂation targeting is analytically more complex while displaying very similar qualitative features.
10 Historically, many exchange rate based stabilizations of very high inﬂation have been characterized by an
initial consumption boom followed by a later recession, see Calvo and Vegh (1999) for a survey. Our model
does not incorporate elements that could generate such a boom, such as lack of credibility or wealth effects.
Our result that inﬂation inertia by itself leads to an initial recession is consistent with Calvo and Vegh (1994),
who posit a wage setting equation that is not derived from optimization.
6gains of disinﬂation. Section 5 concludes. Some technical details and proofs are contained in two
appendices.
11
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a small open economy which consists of a government, a continuum of measure one
of identical price-taking inﬁnitely-lived households, and a continuum, indexed by j ∈ [0,1],o f
monopolistically competitive inﬁnitely-lived nontradable goods producing ﬁrms. The economy
trades goods with the rest of the world, and for the prices of these tradable goods purchasing power
parity is assumed to hold. Normalizing the foreign price level to one this implies that the nominal
price of tradables equals the nominal exchange rate Et. The nominal price level of nontradable
goods is denoted by Pt, and the associated inﬂation rate by πt = ˙ Pt/Pt. The relative price of
tradables and nontradables, which will be referred to as the real exchange rate, is et = Et/Pt.T h e
economy can also freely borrow from or lend to the rest of the world, and uncovered interest parity
i sa s s u m e dt oh o l d :
it = r + εt .( 1 )
Here r is the exogenous, constant and positive real international interest rate, εt = ˙ Et/Et is
the rate of exchange rate depreciation, and it is the nominal interest rate on domestic currency
denominated assets.
11 An additional appendix with detailed derivations of all key equations is available from the authors upon request.
7Households
Households maximize lifetime utility, which depends on their consumption of homogenous
tradable goods c∗
t, heterogeneous nontradablegoodsct(j), j ∈ [0,1], andutilityfromleisure1−Lt,
where 1 is the ﬁxed endowment of time and Lt is total labor supply to ﬁrms. To rule out inessential
dynamics households’ person a ld i s c o u n tr a t ei sa s s u m ed to equal the real return r on international


































t)+( 1− γ)ln(ct)+κln(1 − Lt)]e
−rtdt . (5)











Here mt(Mt) are real (nominal) money balances, with mt = Mt/Et,a n dα is constant inverse
8velocity. The opportunity cost of holding one unit of money is equal to the nominal interest rate,
which given our assumption of predetermined positive exchange rate depreciation (see below)
and uncovered interest parity must be greater than zero. The cash-in-advance constraint will
therefore be binding at all times. Households receive a ﬁxed endowment of tradable goods y∗,
and government lump-sum transfers in terms of tradables τt.F r o m ﬁrms they receive nominal
wages WtLt and nominal lump-sum proﬁt distributions
R 1
0 Πt(j)dj.T h e i rﬂow budget constraint
is
˙ bt = rbt − ˙ mt − εtmt + y
∗ − c
∗












After imposing the no Ponzi games condition limt→∞(bt + mt)e−rt ≥ 0, we can write their
lifetime budget constraint as





























The representative household maximizes (5) subject to (6) and (8), with (6) binding. The ﬁrst

















(1 − Lt)(1 − γ)
. (11)
9Here λ is the constant multiplier of the lifetime budget constraint (8), equal to the shadow
value of lifetime wealth. Equation (9) equates the marginal utility of tradables consumption to
the marginal utility of wealth times the effective price of consumption, the latter being equal to
the purchase price plus the cost of holding the money balances necessary to conduct transactions.
Equation (10) equates the marginal rate of substitution between tradables and nontradables to their
relative price, the real exchange rate. Equation (11) equates the real wage to the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure, corrected for a monetary distortion. The latter is
increasing in deviations from the Friedman rule.
Firms
Firms in the nontradables sector are distributed uniformly along the unit interval and have linear
production functions in labor input lt(j):
yt(j)=lt(j),j ∈ [0,1] . (12)
They are price takers in the labor market and monopolistically competitive in the goods market.
Firms distribute all nominal proﬁts Πt(j) to households in a lump-sum fashion:
Πt(j)=Pt(j)ct(j) − Wtlt(j),j ∈ [0,1] . (13)
Following Calvo (1983), it is assumed that ﬁrms only get infrequent opportunities to change
their prices, and that these opportunities arrive as exogenous random processes. For each ﬁrm they
follow an exponential distribu t i o nw i t hp r o b a bility density δe−δt, and are therefore independent
of their last occurrence. They are also independent across ﬁrms. This allows the application of
10a law of large numbers and implies that ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty does not translate into income
uncertainty for the representative household.
Firms maximize the present discounted value of real future proﬁts each time they are allowed
to change prices. Their discount rate is the own rate of interest for nontradable goods r + εt − πt,
and in addition they weight proﬁts at each future time by the probability that today’s price will still
be in force. Firms’ real marginal cost equals the real wage in terms of nontradables wt = Wt/Pt,
where Wt and Pt are taken as given. Firms receive a proportional output subsidy sub =( σ − 1)−1
from the government. This offsets the steady statemarkup distortion that arises under monopolistic
competition (see e.g. Woodford (2002)). Crucially for thispaper, wheneverﬁrms do receive a price
changing opportunity they determine an optimal price schedule, consisting of today’s price level
V
j
t and a ﬁrm speciﬁci n ﬂation rate v
j
t. If the price schedule of product variety j was last set at



























ys(j)(1 + sub) − wsls(j)
#
ds , (15)
subject to the production function (12), and subject to goods demand (3). Given (14) the goods











Note that the maximization problem is identical for all ﬁrms that receive a price changing

















We deﬁne the new variable pt ≡ Vt/Pt, the initial relative price of new price setters. Note also
that, for s>t , Ps = Pte
R s
















t (πr−vt)dr − ws
i
ds =0 . (17)
Steady state values will be denoted by a bar above the respective variable. Note that in steady
state, for a constant rate of exchange rate depreciation ¯ ε,w em u s th a v e¯ π =¯ v =¯ ε and ¯ p =1 .T h e


















t (πr−vt)dr − ws
i
ds =0 . (18)
Next we linearize (17) and (18) around the steady state.
































ds =0 . (20)




=( δ + r)(pt − wt)+vt − πt , (21)











= vt − πt . (22)
We combine (21) and (22) to obtain the following differential equation for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
inﬂation rate vt:
˙ vt = −(δ + r)
2 (pt − wt) . (23)
It is clear that υt is a jump variable. When there is a discrete change in the monetary policy
regime it will be optimal for ﬁrms receiving a price changing signal to allow discrete changes in
both their current price and their ﬁrm speciﬁci n ﬂation rate.
To complete the description of price dynamics we now turn to the aggregate price index. When













To obtain an expression for the aggregate inﬂation rate we ﬁrst take the derivative of (24) with


















Next we linearize this expression around the steady state:






(vs − ¯ ε)+¯ ε(1 − σ)
µ







This expression can be simpliﬁed by realizing that the price index (24) can, after applying the












ds =0 . (27)
Substituting this expression into (26) we obtain




−δ(t−s)(vs −¯ ε)ds . (28)







This variable is predetermined, and its time derivative is
˙ ψt = δ(vt −¯ ε) − δ(ψt −¯ ε) . (30)
Using the deﬁnition of ψt we can rewrite the expression for aggregate inﬂation as
(πt − ¯ ε)=δ(pt − 1) + (ψt −¯ ε) . (31)
This is a key equation. The second term reﬂects inertia in the aggregate inﬂation rate through
the historic pricing policies of ﬁrms which have not yet received a price changing opportunity. The
ﬁrst term, the initial relative price of new price setters pt,i sf r e et oj u m pa tt i m e0. Therefore,
despite the presence of an inertial component, aggregate inﬂa t i o ni saf r e eo rj u m pv a r i a b l e . I t s
derivative with respect to time is found, after some algebra, to equal
˙ πt = −(3δ +2 r)(ψt −¯ ε)+2 δ(vt −¯ ε)+( δ +2 r)(πt − ¯ ε) − 2δ(δ + r)(wt − 1) . (32)





(ψt −¯ ε) −
(δ + r)2
δ
(πt −¯ ε)+( δ + r)
2 (wt − 1) . (33)
The system of differential equations (30), (32) and (33) in ψ, π and v must be closed with
a fourth equation for real marginal cost w, derived from (11), to fully characterize the dynamic
behavior of this economy. To do so we must ﬁrst describe government behavior and deﬁne
equilibrium.
Government
The government owns a stock of net foreign assets ht,i s s u e sm o n e yMt, and makes lump-sum
transfers τt.I t sﬂow budget constraint is
˙ ht = rht + ˙ mt + εtmt − τt − sub(ct/et) ,








et. By imposing the transversality
condition limt→∞(ht − mt)e−rt =0one obtains the government’s lifetime constraint
h0 − m0 +
Z ∞
0
(itmt − τt − sub(ct/et))e
−rtdt =0. (34)
A government policy is deﬁned as a list of time paths {Et,τt}
∞
t=0 such that, given the time
paths {mt,c t,P t}
∞
t=0, the constraint (34) holds. In particular, ﬁscal policy {τt}
∞
t=0 i sa s s u m e dt ob e
Ricardian. As for exchange rate policy {Et}
∞
t=0, we assume that the government reduces inﬂation
by a surprise announcement at time 0 of a permanently lower rate of exchange rate depreciation:
εt = ε
h ,t∈ (−∞,0) , (35)
εt = ε
l ,t∈ [0,∞) .
15Equilibrium
The list of time paths {bt,h t,m t,c ∗
t,y ∗
t,L t,c t,y t,l t(j),c t(j),y t(j),j∈ [0,1]}
∞
t=0 is an









t=0, with the relationship between Pt and Pt(j) given




t given by (14). Finally let ft = bt + ht,t h e
economy’s overall level of net foreign assets. Then equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
A perfect foresight equilibrium given f0 is an allocation, a price system, and a government
policy such that (a) given the government policy and the price system, the allocation solves
the household’s problem of maximizing (5)s u b j e c tt o( 6) and (8), with (6) binding, (b) given









t,y t(j),l t(j),j∈ [0,1]
ª∞
t=0 solve ﬁrms’ problem of maximizing (15) subject to
(12)a n d( 16),
(c) the nontradable goods market clears for all goods and at all times,
yt(j)=ct(j) ∀t,∀j ∈ [0,1] , (36)





Equations (34), (8) holding with equality, and the deﬁnition of equilibrium imply that the











16Combining this constraint with the ﬁrst order condition (9) one can derive the path of tradables
consumption. This is trivial for the case of a constant nominal interest rate such as in our assumed





∗ + rf0 ∀t. (39)
Note that, even for the more general disinﬂation policies discussed in Section 4, the equilibrium
paths of tradables consumption and therefore of net foreign assets can be computed independently
from the rest of the economy because they are functions only of endowments (f0 and y∗) and of
exogenous world and policy variables (r and εt). This is useful in computing the equilibrium of
the nontradable goods market.
Complete Dynamic System
The results of the previous subsection can be used to derive a differential equation for real
marginalcostw from(11). Webeginbylinearizingtheequationaroundthesteadystate, obtaining
(wt − 1) = (lnct − ln¯ c)+
α
1+α¯ ı
(εt − ¯ ε)+
¯ L
1 − ¯ L
(lnLt − ln ¯ L) . (40)
To make further progress we have to establish a relationship between c and L.I ti ss h o w ni n
Appendix A that ¯ L =¯ c and that, after linearizing, one obtains
lnLt − ln ¯ L =l nct − ln¯ c. (41)
Therefore (40) simpliﬁes to
(wt − 1) =
1
1 − ¯ c
(lnct − ln¯ c)+
α
1+α¯ ı
(εt −¯ ε) . (42)
17Note that steady state nontradables consumption ¯ c is a strictly decreasing function of the
exogenous steady state nominal interest rate¯ ı.T h i sr e ﬂects the negative effect of deviations from
the Friedman rule on steady state output, which will play an important part in the welfare analysis.
It can be seen in the steady state version of (11):
¯ c =
(1 − γ)
(1 − γ)+κ(1 + α¯ ı)
. (43)
Next we linearize equation (10) to obtain the ﬁrst term of equation (42):
(ln(ct) − ln(¯ c)) = (ln(c
∗
t) − ln(¯ c
∗)) + (ln(et) − ln(¯ e)) . (44)
To derive a differential equation for wt note ﬁrst that, given (9) and our assumptions about
government policy, exchange rate depreciation and the tradables consumption proﬁle satisfy ˙ εt =0
and ˙ c∗
t =0 . Secondly, for the real exchange rate we have
•
(lnet)=εt − πt . (45)
Therefore we ﬁnally obtain
˙ wt = −
µ
1





1 − ¯ c
¶
(εt − ¯ ε) . (46)
This equation says that a real appreciation, i.e. a rising relative price of nontradables, is
associated with a fall in real wages in the nontradables sector. The reason is that the higher relative
price lowers the demand for nontradables output and therefore for labor, which depresses the real
wage.
We now show that wt is a predetermined variable. Consider equation (42) and the possibility
of jumps at time 0. The excess demand component is decomposed in (44). The real exchange
18rate is predetermined under predetermined nominal exchange rates and sticky prices, while the
tradables consumption path is a function only of exogenous lifetime resources and government
policies. This makes excess demand a predetermined variable. See Ghezzi (2001) and Calvo and
Vegh (1994) for similar arguments. Jumps in εt in equation (42) are also exogenous. Therefore
wt is a predetermined variable, along with ψt.T h ev a r i a b l e svt and πt a r ef r e et oj u m pa tt i m e0.
The full dynamic system for this economy is represented by equations (30), (33), (32) and (46). In


















δ (δ + r)2


























(εt−¯ ε) . (47)
In Appendix B we prove that this system has two eigenvalues with positive real parts and two
with negative real parts. Given our results about the number of predetermined variables this proves
that the system is saddle path stable. It can further be shown numerically that for a very large range
of relevant parameter values
13 all roots are real.
3 Model Solution and Discussion
Calibration
In this section we compute solution paths for the model after assigning the parameter values
shown in Table 1. The time unit for calibration of stock-ﬂow ratios is one quarter. We consider a
relatively moderate disinﬂation from 20% to 10%, which is of the order of magnitude of several
recent and current Latin American disinﬂations. The parameters α and r are calibrated based on
13 We searched over δ ∈ [0.05, 2], leaving all other values at those used below in the calibrations.
19sample averages for Brazil between the beginning of 1995 and the end of 1998, corresponding to
the main period of that country’s exchange rate based disinﬂation plan. Inverse velocity α is set
equal to the average of the M2/GDP ratio, giving α =1 .118. The real marginal cost of Brazil’s
borrowing in international capital markets is given by the nominal Brady bond yield adjusted for
US inﬂation, which equals r =1 2 .68% p.a.. A 50% share of tradables in consumption γ is
empirically reasonable for most countries, see De Gregorio, Giovannini and Wolf (1994). The
value for the proportion of time spent working in steady state, ¯ L =1 /3, is based on the evidence
cited in Cooley and Prescott (1995). We assume that this is the value associated with the high
inﬂation steady state, and compute the larger value associated with lowinﬂation from (11). Finally,
the average length of price quotations of four quarters implied by δ =1 /4 is reasonable, see the
e v i d e n c ec i t e di nO b s t f e l da n dR o g o f f(1996, chapter 10) and Taylor (1998).
Without loss of generality we normalize the tradables endowment to y∗ = ¯ L =¯ c, and initial net
foreign assets to f0 =0 . Note that for the purpose of presenting computed solution paths in Figure
1 we renormalize the initial steady state values of tradables and nontradables consumption to 1.
The log-linear speciﬁcation of the utility index implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
one. Empirical estimates of this elasticity are typically below one, as in Reinhart and Vegh (1995).
However, see Ogaki and Reinhart (1998) and Eckstein and Leiderman (1992) for examples of
estimates closer to one.
20Parameter Value Description
εh 20% p.a. Initial exchange rate depreciation
εl 10% p.a. Exchange rate depreciation during stabilization
α 1.118 Inverse velocity
r 12.68% p.a. Real international interest rate
γ 0.5 Share of tradables in consumption
¯ L 1/3 Proportion of time spent working
in the high inﬂation steady state
δ 1/4 Inverse of average contract length in quarters (4)
Table 1: Parameter Values
Dynamic Response to Disinﬂation
Figure 2 shows equilibrium paths for an unanticipated permanent inﬂation stabilization from
20% p.a. to 10% p.a. In a conventional Calvo-Yun sticky price model this would have no real
effects, and aggregate inﬂation would immediately jump to 10%. By contrast, in our model
inﬂation π does not immediately jump to the new lower steady state level. As can be seen in
equation (31), this has two main reasons. The ﬁrst is the lingering inﬂuence of historic price
setting decisions on current aggregate inﬂation through the weighted average of past ﬁrm-speciﬁc
inﬂation rates ψ.W h i l e ψ immediately starts to decline it can only adjust slowly as and when
additional ﬁrms revise their pricing policies. The second reason is the behavior of current price
setters. Given the permanent nature of disinﬂation, the response of their updating rate vt is very
strong, and consequently the extent of their front loading pt need not change very much. But pt
is the second component of aggregate inﬂation. Inﬂation therefore also responds slowly because
current price setters can spread their response to new information out over time, unlike in the
Calvo-Yun model.
21The slow response of nontradables inﬂation combined with the immediately lower exchange
rate depreciation implies that the real exchange rate appreciates sharply. In other words, the own
realrateofinterestonnontradablesr+ε−π initiallyfallssharply, givingrisetoadownwardsloping
path of nontradables consumption. The lowest point, an output loss of around 2%, is reached at
the time nontradables inﬂation starts to undershoot exchange rate depreciation, thereby starting to
depreciate the real exchange rate to its new equilibrium level. The nontradables recession is fairly
long-lived at around a two-year duration.
In the new steady state nontradables output is permanently higher, reﬂecting the efﬁciency
gain resulting from a reduction in the monetary distortion to the consumption-leisure choice, see
equation (43). Disinﬂation therefore entails initial output costs and eventual permanent output
gains. A welfare-theoretic evaluation of this trade-off is undertaken in Section 4.
4W e l f a r e
In analyzing the effects of disinﬂation policy in the previous section, it was found that there is a
trade-off between costs due to an initial recession and beneﬁts due to eventually smaller inﬂation-
induced distortions to the consumption-leisure choice. The appro p r i a t em e t r i ct oe v a l u a t et h i s
trade-off is the compensating variation in lifetime consumption introduced by Lucas (1987). The
net welfare gain accomplished by a permanent reduction in the rate of exchange rate depreciation
is deﬁn e da st h ef r a c t i o nb yw h i c hc onsumers’ original steady state consumption basket ¯ c∗γ¯ c1−γ
would have to be increased to make them indifferent between their lifetime utility in the
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Figure 1 : Permanent Disinﬂation
23old, high inﬂation steady state and the lifetime utility achieved along the equilibrium path to the
new, low inﬂation steady state. For the disinﬂation shown in Figure 1 this calculation produces
a small welfare gain of 0.0272%. That is a very small gain from a 10% reduction in inﬂation.
Some further comments are therefore warranted. Most importantly, this is a net gain after taking
account of the welfare costs of the nontradables recession. Furthermore, it is not clear that adding
more features to the model would necessarily increase that gain signiﬁcantly. On the one hand
one may prefer to introduce different or even multiple monetary distortions, which would produce
larger efﬁciency gains. But another reasonable generalization would be the introduction of wage
stickiness, which could considerably increase the cost of the recession. Therefore, what we wish
to emphasize in the current paper is the existence of a trade-off when disinﬂating under inﬂation
inertia, rather than the precise welfare numbers obtained.
Next we explore the sensitivity of our welfare results to two parameters, the degree of price
stickiness and the speed of disinﬂation. We parametrize the latter by considering gradual linear
disinﬂation policies of the following form:
˙ εt = −η for t<(ε
h − ε
l)/η , (48)
0 for t ≥ (ε
h − ε
l)/η ,
where the parameter η characterizes the speed of disinﬂation. The results are presented in
Figure 2 below in terms of contours of net utility gains. The horizontal axis is the overall length
of the disinﬂation period or degree of gradualism (εh −εl)/η while the vertical axis is the average
duration of pricing policies 1/δ.T h eﬁgure shows that, for reasonable average contract lengths of
24up to four quarters, a disinﬂation from 20% p.a. to 10% p.a. produces small net welfare gains of
around 0.03% - 0.05%. These gains are always decreasing in 1/δ, because the latter deepens and
prolongs the nontradables recession. For any given 1/δ greater gradualism causes a milder real
appreciation and therefore a shallower nontradables recession. But the downside of gradualism
is the fact that the efﬁciency gains associated with the new less distorted steady state are realized
later. At high 1/δ the ﬁrst effect is stronger and greater gradualism improves welfare. But for lower
1/δ excessive gradualism starts to reduce welfare because the efﬁciency gains are delayed for too
long. This is reﬂected in the fact that the welfare contours eventually bend downwards. Figure 2
suggests that for our chosen value of δ the length of the disinﬂation period should be quite short,
between one and two years.
The same qualitative results hold for any size of disinﬂation in our model. Whether welfare is
increased depends on the size of the monetary distortion, the average duration of pricing policies,
and the degree of gradualism. Similar results will also hold if the monetary distortion is introduced
in other ways as long as lower steady state inﬂation implies higher steady state welfare.
Finally, the minimum possible rate of steady state inﬂation is given by the Friedman rule −r,
which is also the welfare maximizing steady state. This is in contrast to a recent literature
14 which,
u s i n gaf r a m e w o r kw h e r eﬁrms can only choose a price level, ﬁnds that the welfare maximizing
steady state minimizes relative price dispersion and is therefore found close to zero inﬂation, not
at the Friedman rule.
14 See e.g. Woodford (2002).





















































Figure 2: Welfare Gain Contours (%)
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper proposes a model of inﬂation inertia in an environment of maximizing, rational,
forward-looking agents. It has set out one way to reconcile rational expectations staggered pricing
models with important empirical regularitiest h a th a v eb e e nh a r dt oe x p l a i n ,n a m e l yi n ﬂation
inertia and recessionary disinﬂations. In the proposed framework it becomes possible to conduct
an explicit welfare analysis of disinﬂations that quantiﬁes the trade-off between initial recessions
and eventual efﬁciency gains. Under our parameterizations the latterw e r ef o u n dt ob ea l w a y s
larger. As a by-product it was also shown that under our price-setting assumptions the Friedman
rule continues to attain the optimal steady state.
26An attractive feature of this approach is that it accomplishes these objectives while otherwise
remaining ﬁrmly within the ’New Keynesian’ modelling tradition. This opens up rich possibilities
for expanding an already large research agenda.
Appendix A. The Relationship between Labor Supply and
Nontradables Consumption










From the deﬁnition of equilibrium we know that yt(j)=ct(j) and therefore yt = ct.T h e n( 3 )














lt(j)dj = Lt , (A.3)









Then we can derive the following relationship from (A.1) - (A.4):











27This implies that the steady state relationship between labor supply and nontradables
consumption/output is
¯ L =¯ c. (A.6)
Furthermore, (A.5) can be linearized as
¡
lnLt − ln ¯ L
¢

























But from (27) the right-hand side of this equation is zero. For the linearized systemwe therefore
obtain the simple relationship
¡
lnLt − ln ¯ L
¢
=( l nct − ln¯ c) . (A.9)
Appendix B. Roots of the Dynamic System
The characteristic equation of system (47), for simplicity but without loss of generality



















In the following we make use of Theorem 1.2.12 in Horn and Johnson (1985, p. 42). Let the
4 × 4 coefﬁcient matrix in (47) be denoted by A, and the four roots by λ1,λ 2,λ 3,λ 4. Then it must
28be true that







> 0 . (B.2)
There must therefore be zero, two or four roots with negative real part. Furthermore,
λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = tr(A)=2 r>0 . (B.3)
T h i sr u l e so u tt h ec a s eo ff o u rr o o t sw i t hn e g a t i v er e a lp a r t .F o rt h eﬁn a lp a r to ft h ep r o o f ,l e t
χx,y,z be the 3 × 3 principal minor of A associated with columns and rows x, y and z. Then the
theorem states that the following must hold:
λ1λ2λ3 + λ1λ2λ4 + λ1λ3λ4 + λ2λ3λ4 = χ1,2,3 + χ1,2,4 + χ1,3,4 + χ2,3,4 . (B.4)
For the sake of our argument, let the roots λ3 and λ4 have positive real parts. We compute the
right-hand side and rewrite the left-hand side of (B.4) to get
(λ1 + λ2)λ3λ4 + λ1λ2(λ3 + λ4)=−3(δ
2r + δr
2) < 0 . (B.5)
The second term on the left-hand side is positive, and therefore we must have
λ1 + λ2 < 0 . (B.6)
This requires that these two roots be either real and negative or complex with negative real
parts. As mentioned in the text, it can be established numerically that they are in fact real for all
interesting parameter values. The same is true for the positive roots.
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